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There is a strong intuition that conscious beings have a special kind and perhaps an especially high degree of moral significance denied to beings that lack consciousness.
Though we think that the way in which this special significance is spelt out is often misleading, we think that the intuition is well grounded: some kind of consciousness does make a significant difference to a being's moral status.
It is this intuition that explains the excitement surrounding recent work by clinicians and neuroscientists that apparently demonstrates consciousness in patients previously diagnosed as in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). 1 We think that the inference from the experimental data to the presence of consciousness is too hasty. 2 Building on recent work by Colin Klein, we will suggest that a key assumption underlying this inference is far less solid than it has appeared. Our argument casts doubt on methodologies that take command following as a marker for endogenous intentional 1 It is unclear to us how the putative cases of consciousness should alter our classification of these patients. It might seem that such consciousness would shift these patients from a classification of PVS to the minimally conscious state (MCS). Another possibility, however, is that the degree of consciousness would be sufficient to place these patients in the category of locked-in syndrome. We remain neutral on these classificatory issues. 2 One of us has previously questioned whether the data shows that the patients have the kind of consciousness routinely assumed to be at issue, namely phenomenal consciousness. Since phenomenal consciousness is not the kind of consciousness that actually does the bulk of the work in underwriting moral status of the kind and degree at issue, however, that quibble now seems irrelevant.
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2 agency, and hence for consciousness. Klein himself nonetheless accepts that these patients are conscious, although for reasons other than their apparent ability to follow basic commands. We are not convinced by Klein's reasons for attributing consciousness, and hence adopt a more pessimistic position regarding the interpretation of the data. In closing, we shall argue that even if Klein is right and these patients do enjoy some kind of consciousness, this is not a kind of consciousness that could ground the special kind of moral status typically assigned to conscious human beings.
Methodological Assumptions in the Science of Consciousness
Our aim in this section is to briefly review the key findings that have motivated much of the discussion about borderline states of consciousness, and then highlight some key assumptions at work in the relevant scientific studies. We shall not rehearse the empirical evidence in any detail, given that other chapters in this volume provide extensive discussion. Briefly, there are two key pieces of evidence which have impressed commentators. Owen et al. (2006) showed that the neural activation in a PVS patient who was asked to imagine playing tennis and navigating around their own house was very similar to the neural activation exhibited by healthy controls asked to perform the same tasks. Building on these results, Monti et al. (2010) 
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The precise details of the neural activation exhibited by PVS patients do not much matter for our purposes. What most interests us are the grounds for the inference from these experimental data to the conclusion that the patients are conscious. The key assumption underlying this inference, with which the experimenters and subsequent commentators largely seem to agree, is that the data provide evidence for the presence of agency, which in turn indicates the presence of consciousness (Bayne 2013) . More precisely, the patient's capacity to follow task instructions, such as to imagine playing tennis, is assumed to signal an endogenously generated intention to comply with the instructions, which in turn signals the presence of intentional agency, and hence consciousness. We can break down this inference into two components:
Command Following: Command following is a marker of intentional agency;
i.e. evidence for command following provides strong evidence for the presence of intentional agency.
Agency:
Intentional agency is a marker of consciousness; i.e. evidence for intentional agency provides strong evidence for the presence of consciousness.
In combination, Command Following and Agency seem to guide much of the research into borderline states of consciousness. 3 It has been said that first-personal subjective report is the gold standard for the ascription of consciousness. In the absence of such reports, Agency surely provides the silver standard for consciousness. Since 3 Indeed one of the core diagnostic criteria for transitioning into MCS from PVS is 'following simple commands' on a 'reproducible or sustained basis' (Giacino et al. [2002] Given that the patients at issue in these studies are incapable of verbal report, they do not satisfy the gold standard. Given that they do not exhibit signs of endogenous agency (despite apparent preservation of the neural and motoric machinery required for endogenous agency), they do not satisfy the silver standard. That leaves the bronze standard as the only option for researchers. Reliance on the standard is clearly visible in the work of Owen et al. (2006) and Monti et al. (2010) .
In what follows, our aim is to cast doubt on the use of the bronze standard in such studies. While we do not dispute that this standard provides a useful means of studying consciousness in normal subjects, we have serious concerns about its application in severely brain injured patients. Why accept the inference from command following, a capacity to follow task instructions, to the presence of intentional agency, and thence to consciousness? 6 response, which is not explained by paralysis. Moreover, the studies of Owen et al. (2006) and Monti et al. (2010) suggest that these PVS patients likewise retain a latent capacity to follow task instructions and even answer questions. Given the structural and behavioural similarities, then, it is plausible to suggest that responsive PVS patients are complying with the experimenters' requests in an analogous (or even identical) manner to the way in which AM patients engage in this behavior. 7 On this model, responsive PVS patients are exhibiting stimulus-evoked cognition in response to task commands, but not an endogenously generated intention to imagine playing tennis or navigating about one's house. And if this is right, then Command Following doesn't hold up in the study of borderline states of consciousness either.
One immediate response would be that although the command following exhibited by these patients is stimulus evoked and hence not endogenously initiated, it still signals a residual, functioning, capacity for agency in these subjects. Even though these events are exogenously stimulated, the thought goes, they nonetheless establish the presence of an intentional response, and that is all that is required to establish agency, and hence consciousness. While this move is tempting, we think it ought to be resisted. Let's suppose for the sake of argument that the data do establish the presence of an intentional response, by which we mean an event that is initiated and guided by an intention, an internal motivational state that prompts action (including mental action). We think that intentional responses in this sense do not suffice to establish agency. Agency is best understood as requiring the ability not simply to act or Others are free to define 'agency' as they wish, of course, and one can imagine many less demanding notions than that sketched above. In particular, some may wish to tie agency to mere intentional response, even when that response is stimulus bound and inflexible. However, we think that this attenuated (by our lights) notion of agency provides a weak foundation for the attribution of consciousness to responsive PVS patients. At most, it seems to us to provide grounds for ascribing consciousness to patients only when they are exhibiting a stimulus evoked intentional response.
Consciousness here would be 'fleeting and stimulus-bound', as Klein puts it. 8 This is because if agency is the operative marker for consciousness, and if 'agency' is exhibited only when exogenously evoked, and not at all otherwise, then presumably the evidential situation warrants the attribution of consciousness only when the subject is following the experimenters' commands. In contrast, agency in our 10 having had some consciousness of their surroundings and of events when they were symptomatic.
We are skeptical that either source of evidence provides strong grounds for attributing consciousness to AM patients. Let's first consider self-reports by symptomatic AMs.
Here we should distinguish between two possible cases. The first is self-reports in patients with mild to moderate AM, who we assume are capable of some degree of spontaneous, self-initiated, activity. The second is self-reports in patients with extreme cases of AM, who let's assume are completely incapable of any degree of spontaneous, self-initiated, activity.
There are two worries concerning the first type of case. First, it is unclear why selfreports in such moderate cases of AM should be considered relevant to the argument concerning consciousness in PVS patients. PVS patients, we assume, are most similar to extreme AM patients, if indeed they are similar to AM patients at all. They are most akin to extreme AM patients because (like them) PVS patients exhibit no spontaneous, self-initiated, activity whatsoever. As such, it is of questionable relevance that some moderate AM patients, who are capable of some self-initiated activity, self-report states of consciousness. A second, related, worry is that if moderate AM patients are capable of some spontaneous activity, it is reasonable to infer that they retain some capacity for endogenous intention and agency. But if it is antecedently known that moderate AM patients have some capacity for endogenous agency, then self-reports of consciousness are not even essential: we can simply appeal to Agency, the claim that intentional agency is a strong marker for the 12 say that if stimulus-evoked cognition in general provides insufficient grounds to attribute consciousness, then we should also conclude that stimulus-evoked selfreports of consciousness provide insufficient grounds to attribute consciousness. We admit that there might be some superficial weirdness in this response, but it strikes us as the logical conclusion given the foregoing discussion.
We've been discussing Klein's first source of evidence for consciousness in AM selfreport in symptomatic patients. Klein's second source of evidence is retrospective reports by patients who recover from AM. Some of the problems raised above for self-report also apply to retrospective reports. In particular, if the retrospective reports are from someone who has recovered from mild or moderate AM, then they are of dubious relevance to the issue at hand. In order to focus on the most challenging case, however, let's consider a retrospective report from someone seemingly recovered from extreme AM. 11 Klein discusses Laplane's (1984) 13 testimony in such cases. Given the strikingly bizarre, uncommon, and elusive nature of extreme AM, perhaps it is simply not reasonable to expect recovered subjects to have well formed, reliable, thoughts about their symptomatic state. Second, all of the reports quoted above concern absences or failures, such as the absence of thought or desire. It is extremely unclear how to interpret such reported absences. One option would be to infer that the patient was, while symptomatic, in some sense conscious of having a 'blank in their mind', and that this memory is reported in their retrospective appraisal. Another option, which seems at least equally plausible, however, is that the patient is just trying to find a way to report an absence of consciousness. These retrospective attempts might be aided or enhanced by the fact that the subject, while symptomatic, ex hypothesi would have been capable of certain types of stimulusevoked cognition, and hence would have retained some degree of informational sensitivity to sensory input. Recovered patients might even have access to some of the information that was taken up by the cognitive system during this period. But recalling informational content that might have been conscious in a normal subject is not necessarily recalling consciousness. Recovered patients might also acquire some sort of awareness that their explicit beliefs, desires, and intentions did not change during the symptomatic period, and might report this by saying that they 'wanted nothing' or did not 'have any projects' during this period. Such retrospective appraisals, however, clearly do not force the attribution of conscious awareness of such absences while they were symptomatic.
Further analysis and careful reflection on these puzzling cases is certainly required.
As things stand, however, we find no compelling reason to think that extreme AM 14 patients -the most relevant group, as far as the comparison with PVS patients is concerned -are conscious. At the very least, if there is any consciousness in such patients, these states most likely would be fleeting and stimulus-bound.
The Moral Status Question
In this final section, we consider the moral significance of purported attributions of consciousness in PVS patients. Notwithstanding the skeptical conclusions of the previous two sections, let's suppose for the sake of argument that Klein is correct and that extreme AM patients are conscious, and that responsive PVS patients are similar enough in terms of their deficits to warrant the attribution of consciousness to them too. Let's even suppose that both sets of patients are conscious all (or much) of the time, and not just when they are prompted. Would they then enjoy the moral status that is rightly attributed to normal subjects in virtue of the fact that they are conscious? We suggest that the answer is no.
One of us has previously argued that the bulk of the work in underwriting moral status is done not by the capacity for experience per se, but by the capacity to have series of appropriately linked mental states (Levy 2009; Levy & Savulescu 2009) . A being with an interest in having a life must be able to care how its life goes, and this requires very sophisticated cognitive abilities, such as an ability to conceive of oneself as a being persisting through time, to recall one's past, to plan and to have preferences for how one's life goes (Singer 1993; McMahan 2002) .
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It seems clear that phenomenal consciousness is neither (metaphysically) necessary nor sufficient to sustain this kind of interest in having a life. Rather, it seems that what is required is for the being to self-attribute informational states of the right kind. This in turn requires the simultaneous availability of these informational states to (some of) the consuming systems constitutive of its mind. It follows that a necessary condition of possessing a serious interest in life is something akin to Block's (1995) notion of access consciousness, though -because we wish to avoid building in some of the commitments of Block's notion, such as the stipulation that information of which a being is access consciousness is poised for the rational guidance of its behavior -we shall call this kind of consciousness informational consciousness.
To have a serious interest in life, a being must self-attribute an appropriate set of its mental representations, where the content of these representations concern its own plans and projects, and the ground of these plans and projects: its own existence. A serious interest in life therefore requires self-consciousness, of this self-attributing kind, which in turn depends on informational consciousness in the sense outlined above. Only a being that is self-conscious of an appropriate set of representations can hold itself as having plans and projects and therefore possess future-oriented desires with regard to these plans and projects. Only a being like this can suffer the distinctive harm associated with death: the permanent thwarting of these plans and projects. Only a being who can suffer such a harm has a reason to fear death (rather than dying). There are many complications here that warrant more extended discussion. One such complication is that insofar as responsive PVS patients can be attributed some kind of consciousness, they would admittedly have a degree of moral status that completely nonconscious beings lack. More specifically, if these patients possess peripheral consciousness, we assume that they could have some peripheral awareness of pain and pleasure. We are somewhat unclear on what the nature of such peripheral pains and pleasures would be like: for example, would the attention grabbing nature of pain put pressure on the idea that one could be merely peripherally conscious of pain?
Whatever the truth of the matter, the mere peripheral awareness of pain and pleasure might create obligations to take these states into account, for example, in issuing analgesics or creating environments in which sensory pleasures can be increased. were the case, it would be reasonable to think that they could come to have focal consciousness given other kinds of stimuli. In particular, they might have full-blown focal awareness of pain and pleasure, states that are plausibly of direct moral significance. Here the moral obligations to take these states into account in making treatment decisions, for example, would be much clearer-cut than in the case of merely peripheral pain and pleasure. Even granting these points, however, one of us thinks that these experiences in normal subjects get a great deal of their moral significance from their wider role in agents' mental lives, not from their raw phenomenal feel (Levy 2009 ). Unless it could also be established that these patients are also deploying the resources of informational and self-consciousness in registering and self-ascribing these states, then, it follows that pain is not as bad and pleasure not as good for these patients.
Conclusions
The mental lives of patients in extreme and prolonged states of unresponsiveness remains one of the most puzzling and ethically significant issues in contemporary brain science and medicine. We believe that the waves of excitement surrounding putative findings of consciousness in PVS patients have been premature. The methodology encapsulated in the bronze standard, which takes the ability to follow 
